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Betting platforms face DDoS, fraud and account takeover at once.Our iGaming series looks at how operators fight back.

Deception Inside Casino Networks: Lessons from the 2023 Attacks

The MGM Grand hotel and casino on the Las Vegas Strip at night
The MGM Grand hotel and casino on the Las Vegas Strip at night. Photo: Tristan Surtel, CC BY-SA 4.0, via Wikimedia Commons.

In September 2023 two of the largest casino operators in the United States disclosed cyberattacks within days of each other. At one, hotel check-in, digital room keys, slot machines and websites were disrupted for days, and the company later estimated the impact on its quarterly results at around 100 million dollars. The other reported that customer loyalty data had been stolen and, according to widespread reporting, paid a large ransom. Both incidents were attributed to the same loose group of young, English-speaking attackers who specialised in social engineering.

How the intrusions reportedly began

Public reporting describes a simple opening move: attackers researched employees online, then called an IT help desk pretending to be one of them and asked for help regaining access to their account. With access to identity systems, they could create or take over privileged accounts and move into cloud and virtualisation infrastructure. In one case, ransomware was then deployed against servers.

None of this required exotic malware. It relied on valid credentials, legitimate administration tools and speed, the hardest combination for traditional security tools to detect.

Where deception would have helped

Deception is designed for exactly this situation: an attacker using real accounts and real tools who still has to explore. Some practical options for a gaming company:

  • Decoy privileged accounts in the directory, with names and descriptions that look like domain or cloud administrators. Any attempt to use or query them is an alert.
  • Honeytoken credentials on admin workstations and jump hosts, pointing to decoy servers.
  • Decoy virtualisation hosts and management consoles in the server network, since attackers targeting ransomware value hypervisors highly.
  • Canary records in loyalty and player databases, so stolen data reveals itself when it is used.
  • Decoy file shares named after finance, VIP hosts or surveillance, which an intruder hunting for valuable data would find hard to resist.

Help desk controls matter as much

The most effective fix for this kind of attack is procedural. Identity verification for password and multi-factor resets should not rely on information an attacker can find online. Resets for privileged accounts should require a second person, a call-back to a known number or an in-person check. Organisations that adopted these measures after 2023 closed the door the attackers had used.

A resort is many businesses

An integrated resort runs hotels, restaurants, retail, entertainment, loyalty programmes and gaming under one roof, and often one corporate network. Regulated gaming systems usually have strong controls of their own, but they depend on shared identity, networking and virtualisation. Mapping those dependencies, segmenting them and placing decoys along the paths between them gives defenders a chance to see an intruder before the slot floor goes dark. For more on the technique itself, see our step-by-step guide to how deception works.

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